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Arbitrability and the Applicable Law in the 
Claims Resolution Process for 
Dormant Accounts in Switzerland 
by NATHALIE VOSER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T H E CLAIMS Resolution Tribunal (CRT)1 has its seat in Zurich, and is an 
independent arbitral institution which was created by the Independent Claims 
Resolution Foundation, established pursuant to Articles 80 et seq. of the Swiss 
Civil Code in the autumn of 1997. Its purpose is to adjudicate claims to accounts 
which have been inactive ('dormant') since the end of World War II. The CRT is 
monitored by the Claims Resolution Foundation (which is in turn monitored by 
the Swiss Federal Banking Commission and the Independent Committee of 
Eminent Persons2). The Board of Trustees of the Claims Resolution Foundation 
was responsible for appointing the Chairman of the Tribunal, Professor Hans 
Michael Riemer, and 15 arbitrators. On 15 October 1997, the Board of Trustees 
adopted the Rules of Procedure for the Claims Resolution Process (RP) under 
which the CRT operates.3 
The resolution of claims before the Claims Resolution Tribunal is - by its 
nature - intended to be an arbitration process. However, the CRT must deal with 
claims which are distinctively different from those which come up in 'ordinary' 
Senior Associate, Schellenberg & Haissly (Switzerland); part-time lecturer at the Faculties of Law of the 
Universities of Zurich and St. Gallen. This paper was presented at the ASA Conference on 22 January 1999, 
and a publication in an ASA Special Series is planned. The opinions in it reflect the author's view, which is 
not necessarily the view of the Claims Resolution Tribunal. 
1
 In the following, the term CRT is used for the whole tribunal, as such, as well as for the adjudicating bodies of 
the CRT, i.e. the Sole Arbitrators or the Claims Panels composed of three arbitrators (see Art. 3 RP). 
2
 On 2 May 1996, the Swiss Bankers Association and the World Jewish Restitution Organisation signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding which provided for the creation of The Independent Committee of Eminent 
Persons (ICEP). The ICEP is chaired by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. 
3
 For further details, see Hans Michael Riemer, Georg von Segesser and Brigitte von der Crone, 'Das 
Schiedsgericht fur nachrichtenlose Konten in der Schwei^ (ASA 2/1998), p. 252 er seq. Amance Dourthe-
Perrot, 'Le tribunal arbitral pbur les comptes en desherence en Suisse' in (1999) 1 Rev. de l'Arb. at p. 21 et 
seq. 
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international commercial arbitration. The differences can be summed up, by and 
large, by the following four points: 
• the CRT must decide who the 'rightful owners of a published dormant 
account' are, i.e. the Tribunal must deal with issues of inheritance law;4 
• in Ordinary Procedure (Article 14 RP), the CRT usually deals with more 
than one claimant, and the claimants often come from different jurisdictions; 
• the CRT deals with triangle relationships always involving a Swiss bank, a 
(deceased) account holder, and at least one claimant; 
• the death of the account holder may have occurred a long time ago, which 
can raise issues of transitory provisions of the applicable conflict-of-law and 
substantive law rules. 
In light of the RP and the relevant provisions of Swiss law, the following paper will 
analyze the issues of arbitrability and applicable law under the above circum-
stances. 
II. T H E Q U E S T I O N OF ARBITRABILITY 
(a) Preliminary Remarks 
The relevant relationship in the Claims Resolution Process before the CRT is the 
relationship between the claimant(s) and the Swiss bank. This relationship is 
contractual in nature,5 since the claimant has entered into the position of a pub-
lished account holder who has concluded a contract with a Swiss bank.6 The 
inheritance issue, i.e. the relationship between the claimant and the account 
holder, is only a preliminary question. Thus, there is no issue of arbitrability since 
it is generally accepted that preliminary issues in a contractual relationship are 
arbitrable. However, the Claims Resolution Process is - in reality - most often a 
dispute among several individuals each claiming to be the rightful heir, and not 
between the heirs and the bank. In some cases, the CRT will have to determine 
the validity of a will in order to render a decision on which of several heirs is 
entitled to the assets in the account with the Swiss bank. In these situations, the 
signed Claims Resolution Agreement (CRA) has an effect not only on the rela-
tionship between the claimants and the bank but - more importandy - on the 
See Foreword to the RP. 
Under Swiss substantive law, banking contracts are qualified as mandates, mandate-like contracts or bailment 
contracts. See Daniel Girsberger, Private International Law and Unclaimed Assets in Switzerland (Basel and 
Frankfurt am Main, Bibliothek zur Zeitschrift fiir Schweizerisches Recht 1997), Beiheft 23 at p. .51. 
Under the civil law concept, the claimant becomes the rightful owner, based on succession, immediately after 
the account holder dies. This paper will not deal with issues of other types of ownership, such as beneficial 
ownership based on constructive trusts known in common law jurisdictions. In addition, no view will be 
expressed about the issue of other forms of entidement (such as personal rights, i.e. obligations of the claimant 
towards the account holder) which, based on the open wording of the rules, might be considered a valid basis 
for a claim. 
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relationship between the individual claimants. It is thus expected by each parti-
cipating claimant that the award concerning entitlement based on inheritance 
considerations (including the validity of wills) rendered by the CRT will be binding 
upon each of the claimants. 
Therefore, it appears questionable whether or not the fact that the CRT deals 
prima facie with a contractual relationship with the bank would, for example in the 
context of recognition of the award rendered by the CRT, be sufficient to establish 
the subject-matter arbitrability. The 'true' test should be whether or not the heirs 
could, in a dispute about entitlement concerning only themselves, submit this 
dispute to arbitration. The following sections (see (b) and (c)) focus on this issue. 
(b) General Rule of Arbitrability 
In the 1980s, the question of arbitrability was one of the most difficult issues in 
international arbitration.7 Today, although the clouds have cleared, the difficulties 
are still significant, especially in the context of arbitrating disputes in areas with a 
strong public interest, such as unfair competition and anti-trust or securities 
exchange law. Additionally, areas in which a state authority participates in private 
disputes, such as in patent disputes, bankruptcy issues and non-contentious jur-
isdiction ('Freiwillige Gerichts-barkeit') are typically non-arbitrable. In these fields, 
the tendency is to allow arbitration wherever there is no clear mandatory exclusion 
in the lex arbitri? Finally, due to issues regarding possible injury to someone's 
person or reputation ('Schutz der Personlichkeit'), the subject of arbitrability is 
also of special concern with regard to civil status and capacity, divorce or judicial 
separation,9 and labour law disputes, as well as - as with claims brought before the 
CRT - inheritance matters.10 
The Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA) contains special substantive 
rules ('regie materielle a caractere international' or TPR-Sachnorm') for the 
determination of the arbitrability of an issue before an arbitral tribunal that has its 
seat in Switzerland. Article 177 PILA has autonomously determined that 'any 
dispute involving an economic interest may be subject to an arbitration'. In doing 
so, the authors of the PILA rejected a solution based on a conflict-of-law rule which 
referred the arbitral tribunal to another law (such as the lex causae, or the law of the 
7
 See Botschaft des Bundesgesetzes zum Internationalen Privatrecht of 10 December 1982 (Publication 
82.072) at p. 197. For a comparative analysis, see Publications of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 
(Volume 11), Jurisdictional Problems in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study of Belgian, Dutch, 
English, French, Swedish, Swiss, U.S. and West German Law (1989). 
8
 So far, the relationships between the obligatory participation of state authorities and arbitration has not 
received much attention, but see Peter Schlosser, 'Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit', in 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in gesellschaftsrechdichen und erbrechdichen Angelegenheiten, German Institute of 
Arbitration, Vol. 11 (1996) at pp. 97-111. 
Article 2060 of the French Civil Code has expressly excluded these questions from arbitration. The same 
provision also contains a general rule excluding 'all fields which concern public policy' from arbitration. 
10
 Juno Huber, Die objekuve Schiedsfahigkeit im Zusammenhang mit der Gultigkeit der Schiedsvereinbarung 
(anwendbares Recht) und mit der Vollstreckung (Order public) (1986) at pp. 117-118. 
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seat of one of the parties involved, or the lex fori) in order to determine the 
arbitrability of the issue in question.11 
Since any claim which will have a positive effect on the balance of the claimant's 
assets can be considered to involve an 'economic interest', it is generally recog-
nized under Swiss international arbitration law that it is not only claims resulting 
from a contractual relationship or from tort that qualify as having an 'economic 
interest', but also claims based on family law, property and inheritance law.12/13 
There is very little literature in Switzerland confirming that inheritance matters 
are arbitrable. It has never been disputed by legal commentators that heirs may 
agree to another forum for inheritance disputes. Based on this, it can be assumed 
that heirs can also agree to arbitration for actions for avoidance or reduction of 
testamentary disposition, as well as for the delivery of possessions or the allocation 
and distribution of an estate.14 It follows that for all PILA-govemed claims between 
several claimants, the question of whether or not the claimant is entided to the 
published account holder's assets with the Swiss bank based on inheritance law is -
in principle - arbitrable. This is also the case for claims which are governed by the 
Concordat.15 
With this rule, the PILA has abandoned the generally accepted principle that only disputes which may be 
compromised by the parties can be submitted to arbitration. This is, for example, the view in the Netherlands 
(see Article 1020 (3) of the Dutch Arbitration Act, which has been in force since 1986), and in Switzerland 
under the Concordat. See also Jurisdictional Problems, supra note 7, 127. The old German Arbitration Act 
was based on the same rule, but this has been changed in the revised German arbitration law, which has been 
in force since 1 January 1998. The German Act now uses the same criterion for the determination of 
arbitrability as in Art. 177 PILA (§1030 para. 1 of the German Act on Civil Procedure, ZPO). However, it 
seems that prevailing opinion applies this criterion only to internal arbitration cases, whereas in internal 
situations it is the lex causae of the arbitral agreement which will determine whether or not a dispute is 
arbitrable (see Rolf A. Schiitze, Schiedsgericht und Schiedsverfahren, (2nd ed. 1998) note 97). In the 
UNCITRAL Model Law (1985) the Commission took a very careful approach to the issue of arbitrability by 
adopting a provision which provides that the Model Law does not affect any other laws of the enacting state, by 
virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration. See Art. 5(1) UNCITRAL Model Law 
1985. It was - at the time - considered impossible to provide an exhaustive list of non-arbitrable subject j 
matters which could have formed the basis of a lex specialis in the Model Law. See Howard M. Holtzmann j 
and Joseph E. Neuhaus, A Guide to die UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: ' 
Legislative History and Commentary (The Hague, 1989) at p. 39. 
Robert Briner, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht - Internationales Privatrecht (1996) note 9, Art. 
177. 
' Since the New York Convention (Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, New York, 10 June 1958) allows the recognition of an arbitral award to be denied if the disputed 
issue cannot be settled by arbitration under the law of the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought, a substantive rule on the arbitrability of the issue under the lex arbitri bears the risk that an award may 
not be enforceable in another jurisdiction (Art. V 2(a) New York Convention). Because the courts of the rec-
ognizing states have also applied the distinction between domestic and international public policy to the 
question of the arbitrability of a given issue, the non-arbitrability of the issue has, in practice, led in only a few 
cases to a refusal of enforcement under the Convention. Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration 
Convention of 1958 (1981, reprinted 1994) at pp. 369, 375. 
4
 See especially Thomas Rude, Gultigkeit von Schiedsklauseln in letztwilligen Verfiigungen, ASA Special Series 
No. 8 (1994), p. 146. Rude refers to relevant cases of the Federal Supreme Court and Cantonal Courts. 
Rude, ibid, at p. 146. Some of the arbitration cases submitted to the CRT may not fall within the scope of the 
PILA, but may be governed by the Concordat of the Cantons on Arbitration. The practical impact of the 
Concordat is not very important: by the end of November 1998, 401 or 4.3 per cent of all the claims filed 
were submitted by claimants from Switzerland. Since not all these claims will pass the initial screening, the 
effective number of cases falling under the Concordat is even smaller. 
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(c) Limitations to the Arbitrability of Economic Interests 
Although the tendency is clearly to reduce the restrictions on arbitrability, some 
states still exclude arbitration by means of mandatory rules ('lois d'application 
immediate') in areas such as anti-trust laws or stock exchange provisions. In 
addition to these areas, there is a whole range of provisions intended to protect the 
'weaker party'. A classic example is the 1961 Belgian law on agency,16 and the 
rules excluding arbitration in employment contracts.17 Since inheritance issues 
concern a person's status, and since interested third parties might be involved as 
additional heirs who are not party to the proceedings before the CRT, their 
arbitrability may also be called into question. In the area of inheritance law, the law 
of the concerned states18 might, therefore, provide for (implicit or explicit) 
exclusive jurisdiction of their courts.19 
In the Fincantieri-Canneri Navali Italiani S.p.a. and Oto Melara S.p.A. v. M 
case,20 the Swiss Federal Supreme Court confirmed that Article 177 PILA con-
tained an independent substantive rule for the determination of the arbitrability of 
a given issue. Thus, as a general rule, the arbitral tribunal in Switzerland does not 
have to consider third countries' mandatory rules on arbitrability. However, the 
decision also held that the arbitral tribunal had to consider the mandatory rules 
limiting or excluding arbitrability if the rules in question were of public policy 
character.21 
Non-arbitrability based on the consideration of mandatory rules of concerned 
third states or on public policy reasons, as suggested by the Federal Supreme 
Court, would make an arbitral award appealable but not - or only in extremely 
limited circumstances - null and void. As a rule, it is up to a party to contest the 
arbitrability of the issue.22 The possibility that the CRT might, in practice, en-
counter problems of arbitrability can therefore be virtually excluded, even though 
the CRT does not operate under the usual circumstances of international com-
mercial law. 
16
 See, for example, ICC Case No. 6379 of 1990 (1992) XVII Y B Comm. Arb. 212. 
The arbitrability of employment contracts is not completely excluded under Article 343 of the Swiss Code of 
Obligations. However, the parties to an employment contract are excluded from agreeing in advance to 
arbitration. In other words, an arbitration agreement is only valid once the dispute has commenced. See § 13 
para. 4 of the Law of Court Organization of the Canton of Zurich (GVG). 
In claims before the arbitral tribunal, other concerned states are typically the states of the domicile of the 
claimant and/or of other heirs, and/or the state of the last domicile of the account holder. 
This is especially the case where there is real estate located in that state. In this situation, it is questionable whether 
or not an arbitral tribunal with its seat in Switzerland would have jurisdiction, although more and more legal 
authors are of the opinion that public authorities, such as land registrars, should accept the arbitral tribunals' 
ruling and make entries in the land register as if these rulings had been made by state courts; see Schlosser, supra 
note 8 at p. 111. In Switzerland, Art. 86 para. 2 PILA provides that the Swiss courts must respect the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts of the state where real estate is located with regard to this property. 
20
 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court dated 23 June 1992 (BGE 118 II 353). 
21
 According to Briner this also follows from Art 190 para. 2e PILA, which provides that an award can be set 
aside, where the award is incompatible with public policy; Briner, supra n. 12, notes 18 and 19, Art 177. 
22
 Briner, supra n. 12, note 20, Art 177. 
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However, if a party to proceedings where multiple claims were filed for the same 
account were to claim non-arbitrability of the entidement based on the mandatory 
provisions providing for exclusive jurisdiction of a concerned state, the CRT would 
then have to examine carefully whether or not this should lead to it declining 
jurisdiction. Given the general duty of any arbitral tribunal to make every effort to 
render awards which are enforceable, 23 this question should be examined even if 
the parties do not put forward this argument, assuming that the CRT is aware of 
relevant mandatory provisions. 
III. T H E CHOICE OF APPLICABLE L A W BY T H E CRT IN T H E 
A B S E N C E OF A C H O I C E OF L A W 
(a) General Remarks 
If a claimant has accepted the resolution of his or her claim by means of the 
Claims Resolution Process by the CRT and has, for this purpose, signed the CRA, 
he or she is deemed to have accepted Article 16 RP on the law applicable to the 
resolution of claims before the CRT. 
Article 16 RP has very specific features: first, it makes a distinction between 
different relationships. There is a rule for the relationship between the account 
holder and the claimant on the one hand (see (b)), and for the relationship 
between the Swiss bank and the claimant on the other hand24 (see (c)). Secondly, 
the RP does not explicitly provide for choice of law by the parties (see IV). 
(b) Relationship Between the Published Account Holder and die Claimant 
The relationship between the published account holder and the claimant is, in 
principle, based on the claimant's entitlement to the account holder's assets in 
Switzerland according to the applicable inheritance rules.25 Although the claimant 
has an economic interest, which - as explained in the previous section - deter-
mines the issue of arbitrability, the relationship between the account holder and 
the claimant is a non-monetary, preliminary issue which must be addressed by the 
CRT. 
This section will examine the basic principles of Article 16 paragraph 1 RP (see 
(i)), and will present the conflict-of-law solution in Switzerland and in some other 
jurisdictions (see (ii)), as well as in the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons (see (Hi)). Finally, to conclude 
the analysis, factors for the determination of 'closest connection', as provided for 
in Article 16 paragraph 1 RP, will be suggested. 
23
 See for example Art. 35 ICC Rules. 
The claimant, by means of inheritance, enters into the position of the account holder. 
See comments in n. 5 with regard to the issue of other bases of entitlement. 
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(i) The principles of Article 16 paragraph 1 RP 
TWO-STEP PROCEDURE WITH CLOSEST CONNECTION TEST 
Article 16 paragraph 1 RP provides that the relationship between the published 
account holder or the holder of the power of attorney on the one hand, and the 
claimant on the other, will be determined in accordance with the law to which 
the matter in dispute has the closest connection. In other words, the closest 
connection is the conflict-of-law rule which the CRT must apply in determining 
the applicable law. With this solution, which is identical to Article 187 PILA, the 
authors of the RP have adopted a two-step procedure. Most traditional two-step 
procedures, however, do not operate with the 'closest connection' rule, but give 
the arbitral tribunal the right to choose the conflict-of-law rule which it deems 
appropriate.26 
It has been contended that the flexibility offered by the two-step procedure 
actually gives the arbitrator flexibility to no effect, as an arbitrator is given the 
freedom 'to choose the conflict-of-law-rule he likes best, but not the rule of sub-
stantive law he deems best suited to the occasion'.27 New national arbitration laws 
and institutional arbitration rules have taken this criticism into consideration and 
have consequendy broadened the arbitrator's discretion by allowing him or her to 
choose the applicable substantive law direcdy. With this so-called 'voie directe', the 
arbitrator enjoys almost unlimited freedom in the choice of rules of substantive 
law.28 
In situations as complex as those that are presented to the CRT, it might have 
been useful to build into the RP the same solution as that adopted in the newest 
institutional arbitration rules, i.e. to have given the CRT full discretion to choose 
the law which it deems appropriate. On the other hand, any choice must follow 
careful deliberation by the CRT, and the conflict-of-law rule of the closest con-
nection can also be regarded as only indicating that the choice of a specific sub-
stantive law must be based on valid grounds. 
Under Swiss conflict-of-law rules, the closest connection test, as provided for in 
Article 16 RP, is die basic rule for determining the law applicable to contracts. It is 
assumed that the closest connection exists with the state of the habitual residence 
Art. 33 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1977 and Art. 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 
embodied this method; this pattern was also followed by Art 13.3 of die ICC Rules of 1988. 
Hans Smit, 'The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?' in 
(1986) 9 Colum.J Transnat'l L 22 at p. 24. John R. Crook, 'Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Experience' in (1989) 83 Am.JInt'l L 278 at p. 285. 
The 'voie direct' is, for example, embodied in die French Arbitration Law of 1981 and in Art. 59 of the Rules 
of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO Rules) of 1994. The revised ICC Rules have also 
adopted this mediod, see Art. 17 para. 1 of the ICC Rules of 1998. The Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association (as amended and effective 1 April 1997) state diat the 'tribunal shall apply such law(s) or rules of 
law as it determines to be appropriate' (Art 28(1) AAA Rules). Art. 22.3 (effective 1 January 1998) of the 
revised LCIA rules provides that if the parties have not made a choice of law, 'the Arbitral Tribunal shall 
apply the law(s) or rules of law which it considers appropriate.' 
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of the party who has to perform the characteristic obligation.29 In addition - as 
already mentioned - the Swiss lex arbitri provides the same rule for determining 
the applicable law for arbitral tribunals with their seat in Switzerland, which - by 
definition - can only have jurisdiction over issues of economic interest. Both 
models clearly had commercial settings in mind; it is, in the author's opinion, 
questionable whether or not this model is well adapted to the issue of the choice of 
applicable law for inheritance matters which is, in the vast majority of cases, at 
stake with regard to the relationship between the published account holder and the 
claimant. On the other hand, if the authors of this rule intended to grant the CRT 
wide discretion, this goal has been reached. Based on the broad discretion granted 
it under Article 16 RP, the CRT can develop its own guidelines (see III(b)(iv) 
infra). 
RULES OF LAW VERSUS A NATIONAL LAW 
In commercial arbitration, the whole discussion surrounding lex mercatoria has 
led to a general acceptance that arbitral tribunals can apply 'rules of law' in lieu of a 
body of national law. The discussion concerning the rules of law has recendy been 
encouraged by the publication in 1994 of the UNIDROIT Principles of Inter-
nationa] Commercial Trade. The unresolved question in scholarly work today is 
not whether or not an international arbitral tribunal can base its decision on 'a-
national' or 'private' rules of law, but, rather, which rules qualify as rules of law and 
can thus form a valid basis for a decision. Recendy revised institutional arbitration 
rules have reflected the tendency to apply rules of law, in that they do not provide 
for the application of a certain 'law', but expressly allow the arbitral tribunal to 
apply 'rules of law'.30 
Under Article 187 PILA, which certainly influenced Article 16 paragraph 1 RP, 
it is not obvious at first sight whether or not the arbitral tribunal can - in the 
absence of a choice of law by the parties - base its decision on rules of law. 
Whereas die German and Italian texts of Article 187 PILA refer only to 'law', the 
French text includes the wording 'rules of law" ('regies de droit'). Based on the 
history of Article 187 PILA and on the French wording, it has been maintained 
that the application of 'general principles' is possible.31 
It follows that it would have been preferable to allow explicidy for the appli-
cation of 'rules of law'; in practice, however, this would not have made much of a 
difference, given the lack of a body of rules of law applicable to the question of 
inheritance matters.32 In addition, the CRT could take the view that, similarly to 
Art. 117 PILA. The same rule is applicable within the scope of the Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations of 19 June 1980 (the 'Rome Convention'), in accordance with Art. 4 para. 1 of the 
Rome Convention. 
Art. 17 para. 1 of the ICC Rules of 1998; Art 28(1) AAA Rules. 
A. Karrer, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht - Internationales Privatrecht (1996), note 49 and 70, 
Art. 187. 
Other man in commercial arbitration, it is difficult to imagine non-legislative substantive rules for the issue of 
entitlement based on inheritance which could qualify as rules of law without crossing the line of die CRT 
acting as amiable compositeur. On this issue see IV (c). 
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Article 187 PILA, the wording of Article 16 RP does not exclude the appli-
cation of non-national rules of law, although the French translation of Article 16 
RP does not contain the wording 'regies de droit'.33 
(ii) Brief comparative analysis of conflict-of-law rules in inheritance matters 
PRELIMINARY COMMENTS 
The law applicable to the succession of a deceased person ('Erbstatut') will 
determine all questions relating to circumstances surrounding a special estate 
being created because of the death of a person ('Erbfall'). This encompasses 
questions such as: 
• statutory heirs; 
• unworthiness to inherit; 
• voluntary renunciation of the inheritance estate; 
• how the transfer of the estate should take place (especially whether or not 
die transfer should take place automatically or whether a special act is 
necessary); 
• relationship among several heirs; 
• compulsory portions; and 
• liability of heirs for obligations against the estate ('Nachlassverbindlichkeiten'). 
The basic conflict which has generally determined the discussion in international 
private law for many decades also distinguishes die conflict-of-law solutions in 
inheritance matters. This is the conflict between the principle of nationality 
('Staatsangehorigkeitsprinzip') and the principle of domicile ('Domizilprinzip').34 
Whereas the general trend in continental European conflict-of-law rulings has 
been towards the principle of domicile, and even the 'habitual residence' in 
contractual relationships and tort cases and in the area of a person's status ('Sta-
tutsfragen'), both principles are still strongly represented. In practice, mis means 
that die relevant factor for the law applicable to the estate ('Erbstatut') is either 
determined according to the nationality, or to the domicile or habitual residence of 
the deceased. Similarly to the conflict-of-law solutions in other legal relationships, 
there has been a trend, in international conflict-of-law, with regard to inheritance 
issues, towards applying the law of the last domicile instead of the law of the 
nationality of the deceased.35 
The 'closest connection' test, as provided for in Article 16 RP, does not answer 
the question of which of the two principles is relevant to determining die applic-
able law. In applying this test, the CRT must find a 'just' solution between the two 
The translation does not have a binding effect; see Art. 35 para. 2 RP. 
Tim Brandi, Das Haager Abkommen von 1989 iiber das auf die Erbfolge anzuwendende Recht (Berlin, 
1996) at p. 35. 
Murad Ferid, Internationales Erbrecht, Vols. I-VII, at Vol. I (delivery XL, 1997), Einfuhrung n. 43. 
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conflicting principles, either by using general guidelines (see below (b)(iv)), or on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Apart from the conflicting principles of nationality and domicile, the other 
main problem in the conflict of laws in inheritance issues is how to co-ordinate 
the approaches of the different jurisdictions with regard to the issue of the 
'division of the succession estate' ('Nachlassspaltung'). A division of the estate 
occurs most often when the common-law jurisdictions apply the lex rei sitae to 
immovable assets, and the law of the last domicile of the deceased to the estate's 
movable assets.36 The CRT does not deal direcdy with the issue of division of the 
estate, since the assets of the published account holders with the Swiss banks are of 
a movable nature. 
THE SOLUTION OF THE SWISS CONFLICT-OF-LAW RULES 
The account holder must - as a rule - have been at least 20 years old when he or 
she opened a bank account in Switzerland. At the same time, the CRT only has 
jurisdiction for accounts which have been dormant since 9 May 1945 (Article l(i) 
RP), which makes it likely that the account holder - even if not a victim of the war 
- probably died a long time ago. The inheritance issues with which the CRT is 
faced therefore quite often have intertemporal aspects. According to the Swiss 
intertemporal conflict-of-law rules, facts and legal acts which occurred before the 
new conflict-of-law rules came into force are governed by the law previously in 
force.37 Under Swiss succession law, the transfer of property to the heir occurs 
immediately at the time of death and the legal effect of the transfer is complete. 
Therefore, in cases where the death occurs prior to 1989, a Swiss court would 
apply the conflict-of-law rules that were in effect before the enactment of the PILA 
in January 1989. 
Before the enactment of the PILA, Switzerland followed a 'mixed system' for 
determining the law applicable to succession: according to Article 22 of the 
Federal Law on the Civil Status of Persons Domiciled and Present (NAG),38 the 
law applicable to succession was that in effect at the last domicile of the deceased. 
This rule did not apply to foreigners with their last domicile outside Switzer-
land,39 only to persons who died in Switzerland, and who had their domicile in 
Switzerland in accordance with the rules of Article 23 of the Swiss Civil Code 
(CC). For persons who died outside Switzerland, case law relied on the law 
(including the relevant conflict-of-law rules) of the country of which the deceased 
was a national.40 
Anton K. Schnyder, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht - Internationales Privatrecht (1996) note 
38, Art. 91. For a precise definition of the term 'Nachlassspaltung', see Eva Maria Derstadt, Die 
Notwendigkek der Anpassung bei der Nachlassspaltung im internationalen Erhrecht, (Baden-Baden, 1998) at 
p. 27. 
Art. 196 para. 1 PILA. Girsberger, supra n. 5 at p. 53. 
'Bundesgesetz betreffend die zivilrechtlichen Verhaltnisse der Niedergelassenen und Aufenthalter' of 2.5 June 
1891/10 December 1907/30 June 1973. 
W. Stauffer, Praxis zum NAG (1975) at p. 73. 
Stauffer, ibid, at p. 75. 
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Article 90 PILA has not changed the conflict-of-law rules for persons with their 
last domicile in Switzerland, and states that the succession of a person who had his 
or her last domicile in Switzerland is governed by Swiss law. With regard to 
persons who died abroad, Article 91 of the PILA has not brought about any 
radical change since it still determines the governing law by declaring foreign 
systems of conflict-of-law rules to be applicable. In contrast to the NAG, the 
connecting factor is now the domicile of the deceased, and not their nationality,41 
which reflects the general trend in international conflict of laws mentioned 
above. The so-called 'renvoi' in Article 91 PILA can lead back to Swiss law or to 
a third law, depending on whether or not the renvoi is considered to be limited 
to the substantive laws of the state to which the conflict-of-law rules of the state of 
the person's last domicile refer. There is a tendency in legal work to favour the 
'foreign court theory': this means that a Swiss court will apply the law which 
would be applied if the 'foreign court', (according to Article 91 PILA, the courts 
of the state in which the deceased account holder had his or her last domicile) 
had to decide the case direcdy.42/43 
In both cases (where the applicable law is determined in accordance with the 
PILA and in accordance with the old NAG regime), the question of whether 
the old law, which was in force at the time of the account holder's death, or an 
amended law applies is to be determined by the intertemporal rules of the 
applicable law.44 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
The prevailing rule in Continental Europe is (still) to apply the law (including the 
conflict-of-law rules) of the state of which the deceased is a national; referral back 
(i.e. a 'renvoi'), or to a third law must be taken into account. This is the case in 
Germany,45 in Italy's recendy enacted international private code,46 and in 
Art. 91 para. 1 PILA. 
Schnyder, supra n. 36, note 6, Art 91. Hans Kuhn, Der Renvoi im internadonalen Erbrecht der Schweiz, 
Schweizer Studien zum internadonalen Recht, Bd. 107 (1998) at p. 87. This solution is problematic if the 
foreign law also applies the 'foreign-court' theory. To avoid an ongoing backwards-and-forwards referral, the 
PILA accepts the renvoi or referral to a third law as a referral only to the substantive law. Another solution 
would be to apply the rule of the last domicile (as in Art. 90 PILA) for such situations; see Schnyder, supra n. 
36, note 6, Art. 91. 
As has been pointed out by Walder, one cannot expect that the conflict-of-law rules of the account holder's 
last domicile provide for a renvoi to Swiss law only because the account holder (and now the heirs) had 
contractual obligations against a Swiss bank, or because movable assets are located in Switzerland. See Hans 
Ulrich Walder 'Rechdiches zur Frage der nachrichtenlosen Vermogenswerte auf Schweizer Banken', in 
(1997) 5JZ93atp. 132. 
Since some states - in particular those of Eastern Europe - have amended their succession law and their 
conflict-of-law rules after World War II, the issue of the foreign law's intertemporal rules could arise quite 
often; Girsberger, supra n. .5 at p. 65. 
5ee Art. 25 EGBGB. In certain cases, based on Art. 3 para. 3 EBGBG, the lex rei sitae prevails over the 
application of the law of nationality. Kuhn, supra n. 42 at pp. 97-99; Schnyder, supra n. 36, note 34, Art. 90. 
The new law 218/95, which entered in force on 1 October 1995, contains the relevant rule in Art 46 para. 1, 
see Kuhn, supra n. 42, at pp. 201/202. 
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Austria by means of reference to 'personal status'.47 Spain,48 Portugal49 and 
Greece50 also still refer to the law of the state of which the deceased was a national. 
In Continental Europe, the states which do not follow the principle of nationality 
are, as explained above, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France and Belgium. 
Until recendy, however, the Netherlands did apply the principle of nation-
ality. On 26 September 1996, the Netherlands ratified the Hague 'Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons' 
('Convention', see below, section Hi); since this date, the Convention has been 
the law applicable to succession, following an autonomous enactment by the 
Netherlands based on the fact that it is uncertain if and when the Convention will 
enter into force.51 
As of the last century, France has applied the law of domicile to movable assets 
within the estate. Until 1939, however, it was a matter of dispute whether the 
relevant domicile was the domicile de fait or the domicile de droit which, for 
foreigners, required an authorization. In 1939, in the Labedan52 decision, the 
Cour de Cassation decided that the relevant domicile was the domicile de fait. 
Immovable property is covered by the lex rei sitae.53 
In Belgium, the prevailing solution is to apply die lex rei sitae to immovable 
property and the lex domicilii to movable assets.54 The relevant domicile is 
defined as the 'principal etablissement'. This is where the deceased had his or her 
'emotional and familial centre of interest'.55 
In Israel, the Succession Law of 1965 provides for the application of the 
principle of domicile.56 Most other states in the Near East (such as Iran) follow the 
principle of nationality. The same applies for the Far East (as, for example, Japan 
and China).57 
Similarly to the situation in France, the principle of last domicile (as opposed to 
nationality) is the rule in England and the USA, mough it applies only to movable 
§28 s. 1 Austrian Conflict of Laws; see Kuhn, supra n. 42 at p. 136 et seq. and 150 et seq;, Schnyder, supra n. 
36, note 37, Art. 90. Based on the jurisdictional rule, the estate of the deceased can be split with regard to real 
estate located outside Austria and for the movable assets of foreigners not located in Austria, Kuhn, supra n. 
42 at p. 137. 
Art. 9 s. 8 of the Codigo civil of 1889. In Spain, mere is the additional difficulty that different regional 
inheritance laws are in force. Arts. 13 to 16 (especially 14) determine the applicability of the regional laws; see 
Ferid, supra n. 35, Spain Grundztige note 1. 
Ferid, supra n. 35, Finfuhrung notes 43 and 53. 
Kuhn, supra n. 42 at p. 235. 
ibid, at p. 327 et seq. 
Cass. Civ. 19.6.1939 481. 
Kuhn, supra n. 42 at p. 255 et seq. 
Rigaux/Fallon, Droit International Prive, Vol. 2, Droit positif beige (1993) note 1458; Ferid, supra n. 35, 
Country Report on Belgium, Grdz C note 5. 
The fact that a person was living in Belgium before he or she died might, therefore, not be sufficient to 
establish domicile in accordance with the relevant Belgian law; Rigaux/Fallon, supra n. 54 at 1460. 
Art. 137 of the Succession Law of 1965. Assets located abroad over which the foreign law has exclusive 
jurisdiction are exempted from the general rule (Art 139 of the Succession Law). This exception applies 
primarily to real estate. 
Ferid, supra n. 35, note 43 Einfuhrung. 
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property.58 It must, however, be noted that 'domicile' has a different meaning in 
England than in Continental European states. 
The situation in Latin America is complex, since the states use different con-
necting factors such as location, domicile and nationality as a basis for their uni-
lateral conflict-of-law rules, which determine only the application of the lex fori.59 
(Hi) The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the 
Estates of Deceased Persons 
BACKGROUND 
On 19 October 1988, the 16th Hague Conference adopted the 'Convention on 
die Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons'. The first 
signatory state was Switzerland, which signed the Convention on 1 August 1989. 
Luxemburg and Argentina have also signed die Convention, as has the Nether-
lands - as already mentioned - ratifying it as of 26 September 1996.60 It is, 
therefore, unclear whether or not the Convention will ever come into force since, 
according to Article 28 paragraph 1 of the Convention, this would require the 
ratification of at least three signatory states. 
Reactions to the Convention were mixed, both in Europe (especially Germany) 
and in the United States.61 It is, however, noteworthy that the Advisory Committee 
on Private International Law, along with the US Secretary of State, decided in 
1992 to recommend ratification by the United States.62 It follows that the United 
States may ratify the Convention, even though the reaction of conflict-of-law 
scholars was mixed.63 
THE BASIC RULES ON THE QUESTION OF APPLICABLE LAW 
The preparatory work for this provision was long and complicated, and some 
aspects of the basic rules on the applicable law were heavily disputed until the very 
end.64 The provision that was finally adopted to deal with the applicable law in the 
absence of a choice of law (Article 3 of the Convention) provides as follows: 
(1) Succession is governed by the law of the State in which the deceased at die time of his death 
was habitually resident, if he was men a national of that State. 
(2) Succession is also governed by the law of the State in which the deceased at the time of his 
death was habitually resident if he had been resident there for a period of no less than five 
years immediately preceding his death. However, in exceptional circumstances, if at the 
time of his death he was manifesdy more closely connected with the State of which he was 
then a national, the law of that State applies. 
(3) In other cases succession is governed by the law of the State of which at the time of his 
death the deceased was a national, unless at the time the deceased was more closely 
connected with another State, in which the case the law of the latter State applies. 
Schnyder, supra n. 36, note 38, Art. 90. 
Ferid, supra n. 35, Einfuhrung note 45. 
This reflects the situation as of 17 November 1998. 
For a comprehensive overview of legal opinion, see Brandi, supra n. 34, at p. 34. 
Brandi, supra n. 34 at p. 34. 
See ibid, footnote 48 for a list of opinions. 
For details, see Brandi, ibid, at p. 91 et seq. 
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This provision has three main objectives in mind: first, it should represent an 
acceptable compromise between the systems of domicile and nationality; secondly, 
it seeks a middle ground between the advantages of a flexible solution versus a 
solution which guarantees a predictable outcome; thirdly, the authors wanted to 
find a solution which respected a person's 'centre of life' ('Lebens-mittelpunkt').65 
THE HABITUAL RESIDENCE 
The term 'habitual residence' is open to various interpretations in different 
states, since it is not defined in the Convention itself. It is accepted that the court 
should make an autonomous interpretation regarding a person's habitual resi-
dence.66 The concept of 'habitual residence' has been used so often as a basic 
principle in different Hague Conventions that its interpretation is subject to precise 
guidelines.67 
The first requirement is for a person's presence at the place in question for a 
'certain time' before their death occurred. There is no fixed length of time, but 
using case law as a guideline suggests that a presence of six months meets this 
requirement.68 The question of whether or not a person needs to have a regular 
physical presence at a certain place to fulfil the criteria of 'habitual residence' has 
not found a unanimous answer. Some authors emphasize a person's subjective 
relationship to a certain place and, therefore, consider their regular presence there 
to be un-important. From the history of the provision of Article 3(2) of the 
Convention, one must, however, assume that the authors of this provision 
expected, as a second requirement, a person's habitual residence to be at the place 
where he or she was physically present most of the time, and not where he or she 
had the closest personal or familial relation-ships.69 Nevertheless, and most 
importandy, the 'habitual residence', as defined by the Convention, requires, 
thirdly, that a person have their centre of social and personal relationships at the 
habitual residence. In cases of divergence between a person's 'professional' and a 
'private or social' centre, more emphasis is put on the social man the professional 
relationships.70 
The concept of habitual residence does not require that a person should have 
he intention to remain permanendy at the place of habitual residence. It is not, 
'' Brandi, supra n. 34 at p. 98. 
6
 ibid, at p. 108. It follows that the interpretation of the habitual residence, as defined by Art. 20 PILA, is not 
decisive. Catherine Christen-Westenberg, Kommentar zum Scbweizerischen Privatrecht - Internationales 
Privatrecht (1996) note 27, Art. 20. 
7
 For the following see Brandi, supra note 34 at p. 109 et seq. For the interpretation of the habitual residence 
under the Hague Conventions see Marco Levante's recent study, Wohnsitz und gewohnlicher Aufendialt im 
internationalen Privat- und Zivilprozessrecht der Schweiz (St. Gallen 1998) at p. 78 et seq. 
8
 Levante, ibid, at p. 84. 
9
 Brandi, supra n. 34 at p. 112. 
0
 Aid. at p. 113. 
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therefore, necessary to analyze whether a deceased person had any such intent if 
their physical presence and their centre of social relationships can be deter-
mined.71 
(iv) Conclusion: interpretation of the 'closest connection' in Article 16 
paragraph 1 RP 
BASIC PRINCIPLES 
The above brief overview of the conflict-of-law rules has shown that, in order to 
determine the law applicable to succession, the rules always involve a solution 
based on analysis of the deceased person's situation at the time when their death 
occurred. Although the wording of Article 16 RP states that the closest connection 
to the 'matter in dispute' shall determine the applicable law, this determination 
must be made based on the account holder's situation at the time of his or her 
death. Based on this result, the interpretation of Article 16 paragraph 1 RP leads to 
the conclusion that the relationship between the published account holder (or the 
holder of a power of attorney) on the one hand, and the claimant on the other, 
should be determined in accordance with the law of the state to which the account 
holder had the closest connection at die time of his or her deadi. In view of the 
existing conflict-of-law rules, it cannot be assumed that the closest connection test 
leads to the application of Swiss inheritance law only because the account holder 
established contractual obligations towards a Swiss bank, or because movable 
assets of the account holder's heirs are located in Switzerland.72 
If the account holder's direct heirs are already deceased, the process of 
determining the applicable law must be carried out twice in order to determine the 
next generation's rights to the original estate of the account holder, i.e. to the assets 
located with the Swiss banks. The following analysis will focus on the account 
holder and his or her direct descendants; it should be understood that the same 
principles apply by analogy to determine the inheritance rights for any future 
generations. 
The fact that the relevant connecting factors are determined based on the 
situation of the account holder and already deceased direct heirs, and not on the 
situation of (multiple) claimants to an account, obviates the need to consider more 
than one law for one estate.73 This would not be the case if the factors were 
71
 ibid, at p. 114. Art. 20 para. 1 s. b PILA provides for the definition of the habitual residence for Swiss conflict 
of laws. Although diis provision was influenced by the Hague conventions, the criteria are not identical. The 
Swiss concept focuses more on the length of time of the residence, and does not require that the centre of a 
person's life be established direcdy, since this can be deducted from a person's length of residence. Levante, 
supra note 67 at pp. 105/106. 
72
 See Walder, supra n. 43 at p. 132. 
The estate of the account has most often been split by virtue of the existence of several direct heirs. If those 
heirs survived World War II and lived in different states, the inheritance laws of each of those states must be 
applied to each of the 'new' estates of the deceased direct heirs of the account holder in order to determine 
the inheritance rights of claimants who claim to be entitled to the account based on being heirs of one of the 
several direct heirs of the published account holder. 
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determined on die basis of the claimants' situation, rather than on the basis of the 
account holder's situation.74 
The difficulties which might arise from the early death of the account holder 
would cause substantial problems to state courts which might have to consider old 
conflict-of-law rules of the lex fori as well as old conflict-of-law rules and substantive 
laws of foreign states. For an arbitral tribunal, the situation is clearly different: 
based on the closest connection test, as provided for in Article 16 paragraph 1 RP, 
the CRT does not face such problems, since the closest connection factors can be 
determined independently from any conflict-of-law rule, and thus also indepen-
dently from the transitory provisions of foreign conflict of laws or substantive law. 
However, the fact that a person died a long time ago can have an influence in 
determining the factors for closest connection which should, to a certain degree, 
take into account the law of the 'connected' jurisdictions at the time when the 
death of the account holder occurred. 
There are good reasons why the CRT should adopt the principles of Article 3 
of the Hague Convention as its own guidelines: 
(1) The overview of the conflict of laws in other jurisdictions has revealed a gap 
between states which follow the principle of nationality, and states which 
adopt the principle of domicile. The autiiors of the Hague Convention 
have tried to find a viable compromise between these two principles. Such 
a compromise could facilitate the acceptance of CRT awards by claimants 
living in states with one principle when the account holder died in a state 
where another principle applied.75 A compromise is even more necessary if 
there are multiple claimants who live in different states, each of which 
represents a different principle (for example Germany and the United 
States). 
(2) The strict principle of nationality does not represent the current thinking in 
conflict of laws, since it does not reflect a person's centre of social and 
economic relationships; in a world of constant migration, this principle is 
no longer justified. 
(3) Finally, by relying on the concept of 'habitual residence' rather than 
'domicile', the Hague Convention avoids difficulties caused by the fact that 
the meaning of the term 'domicile' can vary considerably from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction. 
Conversely, this means that claimants from different jurisdictions must - as a rule - accept the fact that die 
arbitral tribunal will not consider dieir laws. However, claimants may enter into settlement agreement widi the 
banks or allow the CRT to base its decision on ex aequo et bono (see IV (c)) if they are aiming at an outcome 
which would be more familiar to them. 
By the end of November 1998, Atag Ernst & Young had received approximately 21 per cent claims from 
claimants from the US, 12 per cent from Germany, 11 per cent from France, and 9.5 per cent from Israel. In 
the US and France the principle of domicile prevails for movable assets, whereas in Germany and Israel the 
claimants would expect the CRT to apply the law of the nationality of the deceased account holder. 
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There are also, however, important reasons why CRT should not rely on the Con-
vention as a guideline: one could very well argue that there is no reason for the 
CRT to apply a (pardy political) compromise instead of determining the applicable 
law on a case-by-case basis. More importantly, the Convention, which was only 
adopted in 1988, does not take into account the fact that the account holders might 
have died a long time ago, and may even be victims of the Holocaust.76 For these 
cases, applying the rules of the Convention as a matter of principle would not be 
justifiable, since this would not respect the fact that the account holders died a long 
time ago under special and unforeseen circumstances. The account holder's 
expectations would inevitably have been influenced by the situation as it then 
stood, and this should outweigh the claimants' expectations to have rules of law 
applied which are current and more familiar to them. 
Although it is difficult to categorize the claims, since each one has a different 
and unique background, it follows from the above that the CRT should, in the 
author's opinion, distinguish between three basic categories of account holders in 
order to determine the applicable law: 
(1) The First category encompasses claims to accounts of account holders who 
neither died as victims of World War II, nor had to flee because of World 
War II. 
(2) In the second category, the account holders did not die during World War 
II, but had to flee (i.e. were refugees in a strict sense), or emigrated to 
another state as a consequence of World War II or the political conditions 
which preceded it. 
(3) The tiiird category includes war victims, i.e. those account holders who 
died as a direct result of the Holocaust (especially after deportation) or 
otherwise in connection with the persecutions of World War II, for 
example, while fleeing. The main determining factor for this category 
would be the account holder's death having occurred during World War 
II, i.e. between 1 September 193977 and 9 May 1945. 
FIRST CATEGORY: ACCOUNT HOLDERS WHO NEITHER DIED AS A DIRECT 
CONSEQUENCE OF WORLD WAR II NOR LEFT THEIR HOME STATE BECAUSE OF WORLD 
WAR II 
For these claims, the advantages of applying the Convention to determine the 
applicable law to the account holder-claimant relationship outweigh the above-
mentioned disadvantages. Where one body such as the CRT has to deal with so 
many jurisdictions, it is appropriate to apply the solution which was reached by the 
delegations in the 16th Hague Convention in 1988 even though it constitutes a 
Judging by the CRT's experience through November 1998, 10 to 20 per cent of the cases have a Holocaust 
connection; see JVZZ of 19 November 1998 at p. 2. 
Invasion of Danzig (Poland) by the German army. In order to take into account the racial and religious 
persecutions that took place before the beginning of World War II, any death that occurred after the 
'Reichskristallnacht' on 9/10 November 1938 counts as falling within mis category. 
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compromise, having only been signed by four states and ratified by one. The 
Convention itself allows for adaptation to individual cases by means of exceptions. 
The fact that the account holders have frequently died long before 1988 is not 
taken into account does not hinder using the rules of the Convention, as the 
'closest connection' test allows consideration of factors other than when and where 
the account holder died. 
As a consequence, the following rules apply for the first category of account 
holders: 
• rule 1: the law of the state of habitual residence of the account holder will 
apply if he or she was resident there for a period of more than five years 
immediately preceding his or her death; however, in exceptional circum-
stances, and if at the time of the account holder's death he or she was 
manifestly more closely connected with the state of which he or she was then 
a national, the law of that state will apply {exception 1); 
• rule 2: the applicable law is the law of the state of habitual residence at the 
time of death if the habitual residence was for less than five years, and if the 
account holder is a national of this state (as a rule, habitual residence requires 
that a person be present in a state for at least six months); 
• rule 3: in other cases, the law of nationality will apply, unless, at the time of 
death, the account holder was more closely connected with another state, in 
which case the law of the latter applies (exception 2). 
At first sight, it is difficult to see when exception 1 could become relevant, since 
the closest connection and the criteria for the determination of habitual residence 
have the same function, i.e. establishing a person's centre of social and personal 
relationships at a given location. However, based on specific examples which were 
brought up by the British delegation in the 16th Hague Conference,78 exception 1 
could become relevant if the account holder had, first, the intent to leave his or her 
habitual residence at a fixed time in the future, or, secondly, if he or she was not 
socially integrated at his or her place of habitual residence, or, thirdly, if he or she 
had ongoing close family and personal ties to the state of his or her nationality. 
The criteria of 'exceptional circumstances' and the 'manifestly' closer connection 
indicate that the exception should be applied restrictively. 
Exception 2 is more straightforward. The authors of the Hague Convention had 
the situation of immigrants in mind. Immigrants often bring their whole family 
with them and do not intend - as a rule - to return to their state of origin. The 
The examples were: 
(1) Retired British persons living in the Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands who only have social 
contact with persons from England, and wish to spend the rest of their lives there. 
(2) An engineer who had a fixed contract in a foreign state for three years but whose contract was then 
extended for another three years. 
See Brandi, supra n. 34 at pp. 117/118. 
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participants of the Hague Conference did not consider it justifiable to have the 
immigrants' succession governed by the law of their nationality.79 
SECOND CATEGORY: REFUGEES AND EMIGRATION AS A CONSEQUENCE OF WORLD 
WAR II 
For the reasons mentioned above, the Convention can be used as a guideline for 
the interpretation of 'closest connection' for this second category of account 
holders. However, the exceptions must be applied in order to take into account 
the special circumstances of World War II when determining the applicable law 
under Article 16 RP. 
For individuals who had to flee from Germany, or from an occupied state, 
before or during World War II, and who would, under the applicable conven-
tions, count as refugees, there are two possible scenarios. 
On the one hand, the concept of habitual residence is based on a person having 
'free' choice regarding where they wish to live. If a person's presence at a given 
location occurred against their will, then no relevant habitual residence can be 
assumed.80 It would, therefore, seem justifiable to apply exception 1. The relevant 
five-year period should begin after the end of World War II, and the law at the 
new habitual residence would then apply from 9 May 1950 onwards. Before this 
date, succession would fall, as a rule, under the law of the nationality of the 
deceased.81 
On the other hand, a person could have chosen to leave their home country in 
order to make a conscious and intentional break with the past. This was probably 
most often the case if emigration took place in the years before the outbreak of 
World War II, as a consequence of the racial and religious discrimination during 
that time. If the account holder emigrated after the war was officially over, i.e. after 
9 May 1945, it can again be assumed that his or her leaving the home country was 
not a temporary move, since there was usually no intention to return. This was 
basically the setting which the members of the 16th Hague Conference had in 
mind when they created the exception to the rule of nationality in Article 3(3) of 
the Convention (exception 2). For refugees, this would correspond to Article 12.1 
of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Article 12.1 of the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954: both conventions 
state that the relevant connecting factor for the determination of a personal rela-
tionship, to which the inheritance issue belongs, is not nationality but domicile.82 It 
would seem unfair not to apply the law applicable at the new habitual residence to 
refugees who had renounced their home states, but who had still not been released 
from their old nationality before the five-year period had elapsed. 
J
 ibid, at p. 123. 
|° ibid, at p. 115. 
If, at the time of their death, the deceased had the nationality of the state of immigration, this state's law 
applies (rule 2). 
According to the leading view in Germany, domicile should be understood in the sense of 'habitual residence' 
in order to allow a consistent application of the conventions; Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht 
(1997) at p. 246. 
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This second argument prevails and, as a result, exception 2 should apply to 
emigrants and refugees. The succession of account holders who emigrated or fled 
before, during or in the aftermath of the war and died before the five years had 
elapsed should, as a rule, therefore be governed by the law in effect at their new 
place of habitual residence. In exceptional circumstances (if they intended to 
return to their home country and/or if all the rest of the family remained there; if 
the account holder basically waited until the war was over to return to his or her 
home country), there might be justification for applying exception 1 after the five-
year period had elapsed, and for basing succession on the nationality of the 
account holder. 
THIRD CATEGORY: WAR VICTIMS 
The succession of account holders who died as a direct consequence of World 
War II is most closely connected to their nationality at the time of their death. As 
already mentioned,83 it would seem inappropriate to apply a more modern con-
necting factor, such as habitual residence, to situations that date from long before 
this concept was widely known. Therefore, the succession should fall under the 
law which would have been applied in the state where the account holder died at 
the time of his or her death.84 
There is, naturally, only limited data available on the published account hold-
ers. However, the account holders indicated their country of domicile in the 
banking documents and this has been, to a large extent, reported by the banks to 
Atag Ernst & Young.85 Based on this data, the most frequent domiciles of account 
holders, with regard to claims filed by November 1998, were France (approxi-
mately 20 per cent), Germany (18 per cent), Switzerland and Austria (7 per cent), 
Romania, the United States, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Italy and England 
(all with approximately 2 to 4 per cent). 
Since, at the time of World War II, almost all Continental European states 
referred to the law of nationality,86 this leads to the law of the account holder's 
nationality at the time of his or her death being applicable.87 If an account holder 
died in France, having had his or her domicile de fait, in accordance with French 
law, in France, but having another nationality at the time that his or her death 
occurred, then the French law of domicile should apply to his or her movable 
See supra III (b) (iv) - Basic Principles. 
This conclusion has been reached based on the closest connection test, as provided for in Art 16 RP. As 
explained above (see III (b) (ii) - The solution of Swiss conlict-of-law rules), die application of die principles 
of Swiss intertemporal conflict-of-law rules leads to die application of the previous conflict-of-law system in 
Switzerland, i.e. the NAG. This means that a Swiss court would also apply the law of die nationality of a 
person deceased outside Switzerland before 1989. 
The Swiss banks participating in the Claims Resolution Process reported the information on the Dormant 
Accounts which were found, as well as on the account holders, to Atag Ernst & Young. This formed the basis 
of the two lists of dormant accounts which were published in 1997. 
See supra III (b) (ii) - Other jurisdictions. 
In cases of multiple nationality of the account holder, the CRT is justified in applying Art. 23 para. 2 PILA 
analogously and in submitting die succession to the law of the nationality of the state to which the account 
holder had the closest connection. 
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assets in Switzerland, and not his or her law of nationality. The same applies to 
account holders who died as a result of the war and had their last domicile in 
Belgium but were not of Belgian nationality, since Belgian law applies the lex 
domicilii and not the law of the nationality.88 
Kropholler has correctly pointed out how absurd it would be to make the 
succession of a person who died in a concentration camp dependent on which part 
of Poland the concentration camp was located in (i.e. the Polish, Austrian or 
Prussian part), and on which law was effectively in place during German occu-
pation.89 It follows that, with regard to the above-mentioned place of the account 
holder's death, it must be assumed that this was the state where he or she lived 
before deportation, and not where the concentration camp was located. Therefore, 
it is not necessary to know in which concentration camp a war victim died or 
whether this was on the way to a concentration camp. This rule should also apply 
to account holders who were not killed in concentration camps or on the way to a 
camp, but while trying to escape from Germany or another occupied country, or 
who were killed as a direct result of the war at an unknown place. 
(v) Limitation to the applicable law? 
Under Swiss law, the question of whether or not an arbitral tribunal with its seat in 
Switzerland must apply foreign mandatory rules, as required under Article 19 
PILA,90 is a matter of dispute. Prevalent legal opinion correctly denies the arbi-
trator's obligation to consider foreign mandatory rules direcdy based on Article 19 
PILA.91 At the same time, more and more authors have suggested that a third 
state's mandatory rules must nevertheless be taken into account and have devel-
oped guidelines for their 'application'.92 The issue facing the CRT is, therefore, 
whether or not (after determining die applicable law in accordance with the 
See III (b) (ii) - Other jurisdictions. 
Kropholler, supra n. 82 at p. 265. 
For an overview of scholarly opinion in Switzerland, see Karrer, supra n. 31, note 1624, Art 187; and Daniel 
Hochstrasser, 'Choice of Law and "Foreign" Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration' in (1994) 117 
Int'l. Arb, 60 at p. 64. See also Francois Knoepfler, 'L'article 19 LDIP est-il adapte a ['arbitrage international?' 
in (1993) Etudes de droit international en I'honneur de Pierre Lalive at pp. 531, 533 et seq.; Anton Heini, 
'Kommentar zum Schweizerischen IPRG' (1993) at 1588. 
It is generally recognized today that an arbitral tribunal has to consider the lex arbitri, but does not have a lex 
fori in the same sense as a court does. Article 19 PILA is part of the Swiss lex fori, but was most likely not 
intended to also be part of the lex arbitri. For the same reason, i.e. due to the lack of a lex fori, Art. 19 PILA 
cannot have a direct and unmodified application, since questions on the application of foreign laws are based 
on the Swiss conception of law which would - from the point of view of an arbitral tribunal - put Swiss law in 
an unjustifiably prominent position. 
In recent work, some guidelines have been suggested (see Marc Blessing, 'Choice of Substantive Law in 
International Arbitration' in (1997) 14 J Int'l Arb. at pp. 39-66, 61-62, and Nathalie Voser, 'Mandatory 
Rules of Law as Limitation to the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration' in (1996) 7 
American Review of International Arbitration 3/4 at pp. 345-354; the arbitral tribunal can also take guidance 
from Art 19 PILA and from Art. 7(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention. 
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above-mentioned rules) there are mandatory rules of other states which require 
consideration.93 
In 1976, in the famous Hirsch v. Cohen9i case, the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court had to rule on the following issue: Mr Cohen had English nationality but 
had lived in Switzerland for 20 years prior to his death. By mean of professio iuris, 
the deceased submitted his estate to English law, and his second wife was appointed 
as sole heir. His daughter from his first marriage, who was also living in Switzer-
land, contested the validity of the will and requested that she receive as a minimum 
the compulsory portions of the estate in accordance with Swiss law. The Federal 
Supreme Court held that the compulsory portions were not part of the Swiss ordre 
public even if the professio iuris implied that an heir would receive nothing from 
the estate.95 
Although outside the context of professio iuris the question is less pressing, it 
remains an issue, since it is generally recognized today that truly international 
mandatory rules ('Eingriffsnormen') operate as an 'adjustment' in the context of 
the choice of law by the tribunals and as a limitation to the choice of law by the 
parties. The above ruling of the Federal Supreme Court regarding indefeasible 
interest fits in with a restrictive interpretation of the mandatory rules; such rules 
should go beyond purely individual interests.96 As a result, once the CRT has 
determined the applicable law in accordance with the above-mentioned rules, it 
will not have to consider mandatory portions of the laws of habitual residence or of 
the country of which the claimants are nationals by means of a special connection 
(' Sonderankniipfung').97 
It has been maintained that unworthiness to inherit based on conduct, in 
accordance with Article 540 of the Swiss Civil Code, qualifies as a mandatory rule 
under Article 18 PILA.98 Quite apart from the fact that in the context of the CRT 
it is unlikely that this could become relevant, there is no justifiable reason for the 
CRT (which, like any arbitral tribunal, lacks a lex fori) to treat this provision as a 
mandatory rule, since it does not fall into the narrow category of international 
mandatory rules ('Eingriffsnormen'). 
3
 Mandatory Swiss law must be applied by the courts according to Art. 18 PILA. However, since an 
international arbitral tribunal has no lex fori, and Art. 18 PILA is not part of the lex arbitri the mandatory law 
of Switzerland does not have a paramount position. For an opposing point of view see Monica Machler-Erne, 
Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht - Internationales Privatrecht (1996) n. 20, Art. 18. 
94
 BGE 102 II 136 erseq. 
95
 BGE 102 II 141. 
96
 Voser, supra n. 92 at pp. 348-3.54. 
This is also the rule under the Convention in Art. 7(2)(d). 
Andreas Bucher, Droit international prive suisse, Vol. II (1992), note 987. 
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(c) Relationship Between the Published Holder of a Power of Attorney and die 
Claimant 
(i) Claims against holders of a power of attorney 
The published lists of July and October 1997 contained not only names of account 
holders of published accounts but also names of holders of powers of attorney. So 
far, the percentage of claims with respect to power of attorney holders has been 
low." 
In the context of World War II, powers of attorney for account holders of 
accounts with Swiss banks had two possible functions: 
(1) Proxy situation 1: the account holder was the legal and beneficial owner but 
instructed a representative to manage his or her account because the 
account holder - due to the war - was not able to do so himself or herself. 
For this purpose, the account holder granted a power of attorney to a 
representative to instruct the bank on his or her behalf; or 
(2) Proxy situation 2: the power of attorney holder was, in reality, the beneficial 
owner, but in order to protect his or her assets from confiscation, did not 
present himself/herself as the legal owner but 'only' as the power of 
attorney holder.100 
In proxy situation 1, a claimant can have a claim against the holder of a power of 
attorney based on the fact that the power of attorney holder misused his or her 
power of attorney and withdrew funds inappropriately from the account. Under 
Swiss law this would constitute a breach of the implicit or explicit fiduciary agree-
ment between the account holder and the power of attorney holder. A claimant in 
this situation would have to claim that he or she was the rightful heir of the account 
holder - to be determined in accordance with the guidelines established above -
and that the account holder had a personal (or obligatory) right vis-a-vis the holder 
of the power of attorney (or his inheritance estate) based on the fiduciary agree-
ment between the account holder and the power of attorney holder, and/or based 
on the unlawful conduct of the power of attorney holder (tort). In principle, the 
defendant in such a proceeding is not the bank, but the holder of the power of 
attorney (or his/her estate). However, if the bank participated in illegally misusing 
entrusted assets, a joint claim against the holder of the power of attorney and the 
bank might ensue. In practice, it is unlikely that such cases will come before the 
CRT; so far, none have. It is questionable whether the CRT would have jur-
isdiction for such claims, since such claims against a bank are not for specific assets 
forming part of a published dormant account. 
In the second of the above-mentioned situations (proxy situation 2), both the 
standing of the bank as an opposing party to the claimant and the jurisdiction of 
Until November 1998, less than 1 per cent. 
Art. 1 para, (ii) RP provides that the CRT also has jurisdiction in such cases if the account was opened by a 
Swiss national 'if and to the extent a Sole Arbitrator determines, after consultation with ICEP, that such 
accounts may have been held by a Swiss intermediary for a victim of Nazi persecution'. 
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the CRT are clearer, since the claimant's allegation would be that the assets still in 
the account actually belonged to the holder of the power of attorney and not to the 
legal owner, i.e. the (formal) account holder. Again, under Swiss law the agreement 
concluded between the account holder and the power of attorney holder would , 
constitute an explicit or implicit fiduciary agreement between the account holder j 
and the holder of the power of attorney, whereby the account holder would f 
receive exceeding powers (i.e. he or she could, vis-a-vis third parties, legally do j 
more than would be allowed under the trust agreement). Other than in the first \ 
case, the claimant's claim would be based on him or her being the rightful heir of • 
the power of attorney holder, according to the applicable inheritance rules, and on J 
a fiduciary agreement between the account holder and the power of attorney 
holder, under which agreement it would be determined that the power of attorney 
holder was the beneficial owner of the assets in the account. 
(ii) Applicable law 
According to Article 16 RP, the closest connection test is not only relevant for the 
relationship between the account holder and the claimant(s), but also for the rela-
tionship between the holder of a power of attorney and the claimant(s). In proxy 
situation 2, where the power of attorney holder was, in reality, the beneficial 
owner, the relevant considerations for the claimant's entitlement to the assets are 
exacdy the same as for claims against published account holders. The only dif-
ference is that the relevant deceased person in this situation is not the account 
holder, but the power of attorney holder. 
The wording of Article 16 paragraph 1 RP implies that the closest connection 
test applies only to the relationship between the account holder or power of 
attorney holder on the one hand, and the claimant(s) on the other. However, 
Article 16 paragraph 1 RP also mentions (in brackets) fiduciary agreements. It is 
impossible to imagine how the account holder or the power of attorney holder, on 
the one hand, and the claimant on the other, could possibly have concluded a 
fiduciary agreement. This relationship will always be determined by means of inheri-
tance considerations. It is, therefore, very likely that the intention of the authors of 
the first sentence of Article 16 paragraph 1 RP was also to submit the fiduciary 
agreement between the account holder and the power of attorney holder to the 
closest connection test, and that, therefore, the closest connection test applies not 
only to the relationship between the account holder or power of attorney holder 
on the one hand and the claimant on the other, but also to the relationship 
between the account holder and the power of attorney holder. Without this 
interpretation, the explicit reference to 'fiduciary agreements' does not mean 
anything as it stands. It should, therefore, be assumed that the closest connection 
test also applies to the relationship between the account holder and the power of 
attorney holder. 
The claimant has entered into this relationship by means of inheritance, and 
therefore has either the rights of the account holder vis-a-vis the power of attorney 
holder (proxy situation 1), or the rights of the power of attorney holder vis-a-vis the 
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account holder (proxy situation 2) or the respective heirs/estates. Because the basis 
of the fiduciary relationship was set when the account was opened, the CRT 
should examine the circumstances as they existed at the time when the fiduciary 
relationship was established in order to determine the closest connection in 
accordance with Article 16 RP. 
Since there is a contractual relationship at stake, it is possible and justifiable to 
apply the criterion of performance of the characteristic obligation, which puts the 
closest connection in concrete terms. According to this rule, the closest connection 
is deemed to exist with the state of habitual residence of the party who must 
perform the obligation in question or, if a contract is entered into in the course of 
professional or business activities, with the state of the party's place of business.101 
It is recognized that in fiduciary agreements, it is the trustee who performs the 
characteristic obligation since he or she, similarly to a representative, carries out 
non-monetary obligations.102 
The consequences for the two proxy situations are as follows: 
(1) Proxy situation 1: the power of attorney holder is the trustee and a 
contractual obligation on the part of the account holder's heirs against the 
holder of the power of attorney (or the descendants) falls under the law at 
the habitual residence of the power of attorney holder at the time when the 
fiduciary agreement was concluded. Since it is unlikely that the bank would 
also be part of this agreement, the law applicable to any claim against the 
bank based on assisting in potentially unlawful acts would have to be 
determined independendy. 
(2) Proxy situation 2: in this situation, it is the account holder who is the trustee 
and the applicable law is that of the habitual residence of the account 
holder at the time when the fiduciary agreement with the power of attorney 
holder was concluded. In case of doubt, it can be assumed that this was the 
date of the opening of the bank account. 
The CRT can determine that there is an even closer connection with another law. 
However, in the interests of conformity and predictability of the outcome, the 
CRT should not, in the author's opinion, diverge without valid reason from these 
basic generally recognized rules for determining the applicable law. 
(d) Relationship Between a Swiss Bank and an Account Holder/Claimant 
The relationship at stake is contractual in nature and the banking relationship was 
entered into between the deceased account holder and a Swiss bank. In most cases 
it consisted of103 
Art. 117 para. 2 PILA. 
See e.g. Amstutz, Vogt and Wang, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht - Internationales Phvatrecht 
(1996), note 34 at Art. 117. 
This is based on the recommendations of the Panel of Experts on Interest, Fees and Other Charges 
(established by the Independent Claims Resolution Foundation) of 4 September 1998. 
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• establishing a savings, time or demand deposit; 
• concluding a contract for investments in equities and/or bonds; 
• managing accounts; and/or 
• renting a safe deposit box to the account holder. 
In accordance with Article 16 paragraph 2 RP, the relationship between a Swiss 
bank and a claimant shall be governed by Swiss law. By signing the CRA, and by 
submitting their claims to tire CRT, die claimants have, fherefore, made a choice 
of Swiss law by means of reference to the Rules of Procedure to which the CRA 
refers. Although the original contract was entered into by account holder, the 
claimants have - if recognized as being entitied to the account in accordance with 
die applicable law - eo ipso entered into die contractual relationship, and can 
choose the law to apply to a contract mat was concluded long ago. 
Under Swiss law, the choice of law by means of reference is valid, since the choice 
of law does not require any formalities, and can also be assumed from the cir-
cumstances.104 According to Article 187 PILA, an arbitral tribunal widi its seat in 
Switzerland must respect die parties' choice of law, and can determine die 
applicable law only in the absence of a choice of law. 
It should be noted mat die choice of Swiss law corresponds to die law which 
would, as a rule, be applied by die Swiss courts based on the PIIA. According to 
me principle of performance of die characteristic obligation, die law in effect at die 
business location of die bank is applicable since die duties of the banks in 
die contractual relationships mentioned above constitute die characteristic obli-
gation: aldiough die banking relationship between the account holder and die 
bank usually has mixed status (i.e. cannot clearly be qualified as a contract pro-
vided by die law of obligations), safekeeping assets, managing accounts with bonds 
and/or equities investments, and establishing deposits are generally recognized as 
constituting die characteristic obligations. 
In exceptional circumstances, die account holder and die Swiss bank might 
have made a choice of law at die time when die banking relationship commenced. 
This choice does not prevent parties to today's proceedings from choosing Swiss 
law by reference to the RP in die CRA since, based on the general principle of 
conflict of laws, the choice of die applicable law may be made and changed at any 
time by the parties. If this choice is agreed upon or altered after die conclusion of 
die contract, die choice will have a retroactive effect as of the time of entering into 
die contract.105 
14
 Art. 116 para. 2 PILA. 
15
 Art. 116 para. 3 PIIA. 
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IV. C H O I C E O F L A W A N D A U T H O R I Z A T I O N BY T H E P A R T I E S 
T O D E C I D E EX AEQUO ET BONO 
(a) Relationship Between the Account Holder/Power of Attorney Holder and 
die Claimant 
Since there are no provisions covering the mandatory character of specific RP rules, 
there is no reason why the parties cannot agree to the CRT applying a law other 
than that provided for in the RP, i.e. the law which the CRT determines to be in 
accordance with the principle of closest connection; within the limits of mandatory 
provisions (in the sense of 'Eingriffsnormen') the CRT should respect this choice of 
law. 
As explained above, the author suggests the application of the conflict-of-laws 
rules of the state of the last domicile of account holders who died as a consequence 
of World War II (third category), which, most often, leads to the law of the 
nationality of the account holder. In situations where all the claimants come from 
jurisdictions applying the principle of domicile, a mutual agreement to choose this 
law can be reached. The bank should not refuse to agree to this choice, since it 
should not interfere in the mechanism of allocating the assets to the entitled 
claimants. This might account for why Article 16 paragraph 1 RP explicidy allows 
the involved parties to request the application of talmudic law to inheritance 
matters, and why the CRT must apply this law independendy of whether or not the 
Swiss bank consented to it. 
(b) Relationship Between die Claimant and die Swiss Bank 
Since the RP already provides the choice of Swiss law for the relationship between 
the claimant and the Swiss bank, a question which might arise is whether or not the 
claimants and the Swiss bank can choose a law other than Swiss. Again, it can be 
assumed that the RP does not require the mandatory application of specific 
provisions. Therefore, there is no reason to prevent the parties from choosing a 
law other than Swiss law, after the claim has been submitted to the CRT. 
(c) Decision ex aequo et bono 
According to Article 187 PILA, the parties may authorize the arbitral tribunal to 
decide ex aequo et bono. In international arbitration, the authorization to decide 
according to equitable consideration mainly implies an authorization to decide 
according to transnational legal principles and international trade customs, i.e. the 
arbitral tribunal can decide on the basis of equitable considerations without 
making a decision on the question of which law is applicable.106 In this situation, 
Karrer, supra n. 31, note 187, Art. 187. An opposing opinion maintains that the ex aequo et bono decision 
does not discharge the arbitral tribunal from choosing the applicable law but only grants the discretion to 
correct the result found under the lex causae. This is the solution of the amiable compositeur under French 
law. 
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the arbitral tribunal is only bound by public policy.107 This means - as currently 
understood - by the transnational mandatory rules.108 
There is a distinction to be made in Switzerland between deciding ex aequo et 
bono and the amiable composition. The amiable compositeur, who comes from 
French law, determines the applicable law and then makes the adjustments to the 
outcome of the case which he or she deems necessary. An arbitral tribunal acting 
in amiable composition is not only limited by the international mandatory rules, 
but also by the internal mandatory rules of the applicable law.109 Since the parties 
can allow the arbitral tribunal to act ex aequo et bono, they can also allow the 
tribunal to act as amiable compositeur, which, according to the above definition, is 
less far-reaching.110 
If an arbitral tribunal decides ex aequo et bono without being authorized by the 
parties to do so, its award may be challenged on the grounds that the arbitral 
tribunal has exceeded its authority. It is, therefore, important to respect any form 
requirements for the authorization to decide ex aequo et bono. Whether or not an 
express authorization is necessary is a matter of dispute among Swiss scholars. 
Since the provision in Article 187 paragraph 3 PILA was made in the context of 
the choice of law, and since it is recognized that a choice of law can be made 
implicidy by the parties, it must be assumed that the parties can also implicitly 
authorize the arbitral tribunal to render an ex aequo et bono decision.111 In any 
event, since the circumstances which would allow one to assume such implied 
authorization are difficult to determine, it is advisable to request an express authori-
zation from the parties. 
There are different situations where it would be advisable for the parties to 
give the CRT the authorization to render an award based on ex aequo et bono. 
This is the case when the nationality of an account holder who died during the war 
(first category) cannot be determined, or (for categories two and three) when die 
location of the account holder's habitual residence over the last five years of his or 
her life cannot be determined, or when two generations died during the war, and 
the sequence of the deaths cannot be established. From the point of view of the 
claimants, it might be useful to authorize the CRT to render an ex aequo et bono 
award in situations where the claimants are not willing to conclude a settlement 
agreement, but would nevertheless like to emphasize the concept of equitable 
consideration, as opposed to that of finding the applicable law. 
Bucher and Tschanz, Die neue Internationale Schiedsgerichtbarkeit in der Schweiz, (1989) note 31.5. 
108
 See supra II (c). 
Karrer, supra n. 31, note 191, Art. 187. Bucher and Tschanz, supra n. 107, note 120. 
Bucher and Tschanz, supra n. 107, note 318. 
111
 Karrer, supra n. 31, note 198, Art. 187. 
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V. S U M M A R Y 
Inheritance disputes among several heirs are, in principle, arbitrable, since under 
the Swiss lex arbitri the decisive issue for the determination of arbitrability is 
whetlier or not the dispute involves an economic interest. The Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court has decided that this principle is only limited if foreign rules 
providing for exclusive state jurisdiction are of public policy character. 
The RP does not prevent the parties from making their own choice of 
applicable law. With regard to the relationship between the published account 
holder and the claimant(s), and in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, the 
RP provides for the application of the law which has the closest connection to the 
matter in dispute. An overview of conflict-of-law solutions used by state courts has 
revealed that this relationship should be determined in accordance with the law of 
the state to which the account holder had the closest connection at the time of his 
or her death. In view of the conflict-of-law solutions' consistent emphasis on the 
situation of the deceased at the time of death, it cannot be assumed that contractual 
obligations with a Swiss bank and/or movable assets located in Switzerland con-
stitute a sufficient connection to Switzerland to justify the application of Swiss law. 
In an attempt to establish guidelines for the interpretation of the closest connec-
tion, it has been suggested that the claims be divided into three main categories. It 
is justified to resolve (1) claims unrelated to World War II, and (2) claims with 
regard to account holders who emigrated or had to flee because of World War II 
(but died later) in accordance with the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons adopted in 1988. However, for 
(3), victims of World War II, it would seem more justified to apply the law as it 
would have been applied at the time and place of their death. In the event of a 
death after deportation, it must be assumed that the relevant place was the place 
where the account holder lived permanendy before being deported. 
The closest connection test with regard to the relationship between power of 
attorney holders and claimant(s) in claims against a holder of a power of attorney is 
identical to the test applied to the relationship between account holders and 
claimant(s) in claims against account holders. 
Although not clearly expressed in Article 16 paragraph 1 RP, the closest con-
nection test also applies to fiduciary agreements between the account holder and 
the power of attorney holder where the former was 'only' a trustee and the power 
of attorney holder, in reality, was the beneficial owner. In this situation, the test 
leads to the application of the law in effect at the habitual residence of the account 
holder at the time of the conclusion of the fiduciary agreement with the power of 
attorney holder. 
Article 16 paragraph 2 RP provides that the relationship between the claimant 
and the Swiss bank shall be governed by Swiss law. This is the same solution as 
would be reached by applying the Swiss conflict-of-law rules. 
According to the Swiss lex arbitri the parties to the Claims Resolution Process 
can authorize the CRT to decide ex aequo et bono. The CRT, by means of this 
authorization, can decide on the basis of equitable considerations without making 
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a decision on the question of which law is applicable. It might be useful, especially 
in complex multiparty situations, to grant the CRT this authorization, in order to 
minimize the time until the assets in the dormant accounts can finally be paid to 
the rightful heirs. 
